Circumstances of the accident
At
around 12:30 am on the night of 28 March 2001 during a storm in
the Baltic Sea (Beaufort 9 - very rough sea), the cargo vessel
Tern collided with the oil tanker the Baltic Carrier, at the boundary
between the German and Danish territorial waters approximately 16
nautical miles southeast of the Danish islands Falster and Møn
(collision location: 54°43 N / 12°35 E).
The Tern, flying
the Cypriot flag, had set sail from Cienfuegos in Cuba and was en
route for Latvia with a cargo of 5,037 tonnes of raw sugar. The
tanker Baltic Carrier, registered in the Marshall Islands, was carrying 30,000
tonnes of HFO. She had set sail from Estonia and was on her way
to Gothenburg in Sweden to bunker. Her final destination was Milford
Haven in Wales.
The
Tern rammed the Baltic Carrier in the bow, after veering off course
due to rudder failure and ripped open starboard cargo tank number
6 just in front of the bridge house. The Tern then proceeded to
the German port of Rostock under her own steam.
The
quantity of HFO released was initially estimated at 1,500 to 1,900
tonnes, but was subsequently corrected to 2,700 tonnes (capacity
of tank number 6).

| IFO 380 | |
|---|---|
| Density at 15°C | 0.9753 |
| Viscosity at 50°C | 611 cSt |
| Flash point | 128°C |
| Pour point | 18°C |
| Naphatalene content | 4 % |
Oil pollution response
During
the course of the first few days following the collision, the bad
weather conditions hampered the Danish Coast Guard Authority’s
attempts to respond. Fifteen Danish, Swedish and German vessels
took to sea either to spot slicks or recover the oil. As the oil
was very viscous, mechanical diggers were just as efficient as standard
skimmers. On Sunday 1 April, 940 tonnes were recovered at sea. Airborne
and satellite-based surveillance was maintained from the outset.
Unlike the Erika incident, weather conditions enabled the satellites
to spot the slicks and the footage was made available by ESA, the
European Space Agency.

Despite the fact that this HFO tended to form a stable reverse emulsion
rendering it highly viscous, the oil was not left in the water for
very long and could therefore be pumped. On Monday 2nd April, two
vessels lightered the Baltic Carrier, which was then towed to a
repair yard on 4 April. After the wind dropped to a force 4 southwesterly
wind, it pushed the slicks towards the Danish islands of Falster
and Møn.
On
29 March at 5:30 pm the oil slicks began to beach at Grønesund
and hit the islands of Bogø, Møn and Falster, soiling
a 50 km stretch of coastline. On 30 March, the Danish Civil Defence
Corps was on the scene and set up a command post in the village
of Stubbekøbing. Eight recovery sites were set up, with a
work force of about 210 responders who carried out the clean-up
operation.
Further
to a request from the Danish Authorities, the EC Task Force was
mobilised. A team of three (Gilles Vincent from the EC, Stéphane
Le Floch and Bernard Le Guen from Cedre) was immediately sent to
the scene. From 1st to 5th April, the experts identified the polluted
areas and drew up a list of response techniques likely to be required.
Initial
emergency clean-up was performed under the responsibility of the
Danish Civil Defence that opted for heavy duty machinery and equipment
requisitioned from local companies and in particular from construction
companies (diggers, bulldozers, tippers, suction tanks). It is important
to point out that substantial quantities of oil were recovered by
the end of day 3 (2,000 tonnes). But the physical impact on the
upper foreshores and on the banks was considerable, partly due to
the fact that many of the banks were in the high tide zone and therefore
very sensitive. Environmental deterioration could have been lessened
if the authorities had opted to pump the oil, in view of the fact
that weather conditions at the time were favourable for the onshore
response phase.

Task Force experts came to the conclusion that approximately 50
km of coastline had been polluted and in some areas the slicks were
very thick, especially in the small coves. The areas in question
were marshlands and pebble beaches. The response conducted on the
beaches involved using a bulldozer to remove a layer of polluted
pebbles and of transferring them by lorry to a washing station (disused
quarry). The pebbles were washed with water and surfactant and put
back on their original beach.
Name: Baltic Carrier/Tern
Date: 29 March 2001
Location: Denmark
Accident area : Kadet fairway, Jutland islands, Baltic Sea
Cause of spill : collision
Quantity transported : 30,000 tonnes
Type of pollutant : heavy fuel oil
Quantity spilled : approximately 2,700 tonnes
Ship type : oil tanker
Date built : 2000
Flag : Marshall islands
As far as the marshlands were concerned, equipment deployment had been tricky and lengthy. The marshlands were highly sensitive habitats, classified as nature reserves and were in fact bird sanctuaries. The birds had already started nesting which explained why so many of them had been oiled right from the start of the spill. It is noteworthy that the Danish Authorities decided to systematically eliminate the oiled birds rather than clean them.

The
ECTF assignment came to an end on 4 April after a meeting in Copenhagen
in the Civil Defence Force offices. At that point in time, the quantities
of recovered oil could be broken down as follows:
After removing the bulk of the oil, the 200 responders from the Civil Defence Corps left the area on 10 April after recovering 3,950 tonnes of polluted waste. The local and regional authorities took over and collected a further 6,800 tonnes (July 2001). The collected waste was mainly sand (no seaweed or debris) and was evacuated to Nykobing. The rest was incinerated at the Nyborg treatment station. Approximately 2,500 dead birds were recovered at sea and onshore.

Conclusions and recommendations
In
the feedback report written by the Danish Emergency Management Agency
(DEMA), conclusions and recommendations were made regarding maritime
safety in the Baltic Sea, in addition to how to organise, equip
and train response teams. The report points out that co-operation
really did occur for all concerned, despite the fact that overall
responsibility for the operation was far from optimal. Responders
were clearly seen to be dedicated and fully available to do the
job in hand which is why they did so well. All the more so, when
one considers that the response equipment they used was not geared
to dealing with heavy, viscous oil. Throughout the entire clean-up
operation, systematic attempts were made to find alternative technical
solutions to deal with the spill. In the future, the optimisation
of response conditions will have to be revamped in terms of available
response equipment.
One
other major lesson learned during the response operation was that
the highest priority has to be given to training Crisis Management
Executives in the co-ordination of complicated and lengthy response
jobs. The Baltic Carrier spill has clearly identified the need for
coherent response plans, at national level, that include job descriptions
and guidelines on how best to conduct and manage an operation of
this size in addition to co-ordinating local, county and regional
plans that are necessary components of the National Contingency
Plan.
See also
Links
Last update: April 2006